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Abstract 
 
This paper studies migration decisions of very poor households in a context of high level 
of violence. Our estimates show that high levels of violence encourage households to 
leave their municipality of residence and that welfare  programmes such as conditional 
cash transfer programmes may mitigate these flows, provided the incidence of violence is 
not unduly high.  Other important determinants of migration are the type of property 
rights and social insurance rural households can benefit from.   
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1 Introduction 
 
Colombia’s civil conflict over the last 40 years has displaced many families and 
individuals from their villages of origin. Estimates vary, but it is clear that the problem 
has become, especially in recent decades, a very important one. At least 1.8 million 
individuals were involuntary displaced during the last 15 years, which corresponds to 4.3 
percent of the country’s population and 14 percent of the rural population (Arboleda and 
Correa, 2003).  Casual visits to the main cities in Colombia provide abundant evidence of 
the problem: displaced individuals are visible in poor neighbourhoods and more generally 
on the streets. The consequences of such displacement can be dramatic. In addition to the 
direct act of violence that causes the displacement, individuals often lose their livelihood, 
productive assets and valuable skills, the human capital they possess is often inadequate 
in the new environments, children are removed from school, young people leave rural 
villages and so on and so forth. Evidence has accumulated showing that migrants to the 
main cities in the 1990’s fared worse than the urban poor, in contrast with the traditional 
migrant profile (see Velez, 2002, Table 7) and that displaced population are as poor as 
the poorest population of Colombia even if they are from more heterogeneous 
backgrounds with higher education levels of household heads (Attanasio, Castro, 
Mesnard, 2005). They are particularly vulnerable to malnutrition and health problems 
such that their average rate of mortality is 6 times higher than the national average 
(World Food Program, 2003). 
 
Recently policy makers have shown an increasing interest in building policy 
interventions to mitigate these flows. Discussions have mainly focused on whether and 
how to encourage displaced households to return to their origin villages. For example the 
Colombian government has already considered granting compensation conditional on the 
return of displaced households. One possible alternative is to discourage displacement in 
the first place by making everyone better off at home. In this prospect, welfare 
programmes may contribute to stabilise the socio-economic environment in rural villages 
by encouraging households to remain in their municipalities of origin. This may also 
undermine one systematic strategy used by rebels groups, whose aim is to take control 
over destabilised areas by terrorising civilians. 
 
In this paper, we leave aside the question as to whether or not migration of very poor 
households should be encouraged in such a context and adopt, instead, a positive 
approach. To understand better the decision made by very poor households of leaving 
small towns affected by violence, we measure the relative contribution of different 
factors in this decision, including household and community variables, policy measures 
and violence incidence. Aside from the large set of variables we are able to use given the 
richness of our survey and the size of our sample, the main originality of this work is to 
consider how violence and policy interventions interact among them and with other 
factors traditionally considered in the economic literature on migration. 
  
Importantly, we do not want to focus exclusively on episodes that lead to displacement, 
but rather put these episodes within the context of a set of different incentives, which 
include economic incentives. For this reason, throughout the paper, the concept of 
mobility we use is different from that used in the literature on violence and displacement 
(see, for example, Engel and Ibanez, 2005). Previous studies focussed on the displaced 
individuals that arrive in big cities after large shocks and violent experiences. While this 
is surely important, it is also important to start from the small communities and check 
what happens to individuals that, while affected by violence and other problems, do not 
necessarily move to the big cities but to other places or stay in the municipalities. These 
decisions are not necessarily entirely forced but may still be directly affected by the high 
levels of violence prevailing in Colombian municipalities. 
   
The first aim of the paper is to assess whether traditional motives for economic migration 
apply to households living in the particularly unstable and violent environment 
characterising rural Colombia. This is because migration for economic reasons may have 
different determinants from forced migration, as developed in the next section. To do so 
we study how migration determinants change when the incidence of violence varies, 
using its variation across municipalities we observe in our survey. Moreover, our data 
allow us to capture several dimensions of violence, as well as other shocks affecting 
household income that are interacted with migration determinants. 
 
The second aim of the paper is to assess the impact on migration of policy interventions 
such as the Familias en Acción (hereafter FA). Run by the Colombian government with a 
loan from the IADB and the World Bank, the programme is modelled after the Mexican 
PROGRESA and consists of conditional cash transfers that aim at improving the nutrition 
and education of the poorest Colombians. Although FA has not been designed 
specifically to affect migration behaviour, there are many ways in which household 
mobility might respond to it. On one hand, receiving the benefits of the programme 
makes living in a municipality where the programme operates (hereafter “treated 
municipality”) more attractive than living in a municipality where it does not (“control 
municipality”). On the other hand, receiving cash transfers may also help relaxing 
financial constraints of very poor households, and, hence, allow them to finance their 
migration if migration returns are high relative to its costs. Since these two effects play in 
opposite direction, the effect of receiving the programme on a household mobility is a 
priori ambiguous. Moreover, in line with our first aim, we allow the FA programme to 
affect differently migration decisions in municipalities characterised by different levels of 
violence. The heterogeneous impacts we find suggest that different mechanisms are into 
playing depending on the level of violence. This is also an indirect way of assessing the 
costs of violence for household well-being and whether compensatory cash transfers to 
households affected by violence can be also envisaged as a way of curbing migration 
from highly unstable areas. In a nutshell, our results will show that it is only the case if 
violence is not unduly high. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature that 
motivates the model used to explain household migration in highly unstable 
environments. Section 3 presents the data and Section 4, the main results. Section 5 
proposes several tests to assess the extent to which violence modifies household 
incentives to migrate. Section 6 investigates possible mechanisms explaining why the 
impact of welfare programmes depends on violence incidence. Section 7 concludes by 
establishing policy recommendations based on our main findings. 
 
2 Motivations of the empirical model 
 
There is a large economic literature on the determinants of migration decisions but very 
few economists have studied the specific problems related to violence in politically 
unstable economies and the impact of policy interventions such as welfare programmes. 
In this section we review the determinants of migration identified in the economic 
literature and discuss how household migration may respond to the high incidence of 
violence that characterises Colombia and to policy interventions such as the FA 
programme.  
 
Traditional literature 
 
The main economic framework established by Harris and Todaro (1970) postulates that 
individuals compare their present wage with that available in a potential destination area, 
adjusted for the probability of finding a job. Models have since been expanded to take 
into account more complex determinants of migration decisions. On one hand, they 
outline that migration benefits and costs vary greatly depending on individual 
characteristics. For example, earlier models of human capital emphasize that migration 
returns depend on individuals’ education levels and planning horizon, which explains 
why young and better educated individuals are more likely to migrate (Sjaastad, 1962, 
Becker, 1964, Mincer, 1974, Greenwood, 1997). On the other hand, they insist on the fact 
that individuals have different information on destination areas and have different 
degrees of risk aversion, which are important factors in explaining highly uncertain 
decisions. This explains for example why individuals may migrate repeatedly or 
sequentially to different local labour markets (Pessino, 1991) as they accumulate human 
capital together with information (Da Vanzo, 1983). 
 
More recent studies have investigated the role played by social interactions. First, in line 
with Stark (1991), the “New economic of migration” considers migration as a household 
strategy to diversify risk by sending some members to distant areas while keeping others 
working close by on farm. Then, sociologists and economists have outlined that social 
networks affect strongly migration costs: they help new immigrants in their job and house 
search or by proposing them services (Massey, Alarcon, Durand and Gonzalez, 1987, 
Munshi, 2003) or to cross the borders (Espinosa and Massey, 1997 ) and so on. As a 
result migration costs become endogenous to the migration process as modelled by 
Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996). 
 
In line with these models our analysis will take into account a set of economic factors that 
push households out of their municipality of residence, together with household and 
community characteristics that determine migration costs and benefits. Note that we do 
not observe the destinations chosen by most migrant households and therefore cannot 
control for pull factors in destination areas.1 Also we do not adopt the approach of the 
“New economic of migration” (within household) and restrict our study to the household 
decision to migrate as a whole unit given the limited information we have on the mobility 
of household members in our sample.  
 
Violence and migration 
 
The economic literature on the impact of violence on migration is not very developed, 
partly due to the scarcity of available data, partly because this field was left under the 
domain of political scientists until very recently. However, in a seminal paper, Schultz 
(1971) finds a positive effect of the incidence of homicides on net internal migration rates 
from 1951 to 1964 in Colombia. Morrison and May (1994) use an expected utility 
framework, which postulates that households leave their area of origin when their utility 
to stay is smaller than their utility to move, taking into account all socio-political and 
economic benefits and costs attached to different locations. Their estimates show that 
                                                 
1 The description of our sample below shows that only 114 households have been successfully tracked 
during the first follow up, which is a too small sample to test for the effects of “pull” factors. 
political violence is a key determinant of internal migration rates in Guatemala. Using 
aggregate data, however, these authors cannot capture easily the microeconomic 
underpinnings of household migration decisions in violent context, which is the main 
objective of our study. 
 
However, in the last couple of years there has been a growing attention paid to the 
consequences of civil war and conflicts on displacement and asylum seekers (see for 
example Azam and Hoeffler, 2002, or Hatton, 2004). Although we may argue that forced 
migration and economic migration are of different nature, we cannot exclude that these 
two decisions have common factors. This may explain why, very often, only part of 
households from communities targeted by illegal armed groups decides to move. To 
capture this feature Engel and Ibanez (2005) extend the expected utility framework to 
explain displacement decisions and show that predictions of such models are sometimes 
opposite to those of traditional migration models. For example, households with 
immobile assets like large plots of land that can be easily sized by rebels may feel more 
threatened by violence and, hence, are encouraged to move first, contrary to what the 
standard economic literature would predict. Similarly, risk aversion may induce 
individuals to displace in a violent context, whereas the same individuals would not have 
migrated in a stable context, because of the uncertainties involved by migration decisions 
(Fischer et al, 1997). Or individuals with political responsibilities in their municipalities 
may be the first targeted by rebel or paramilitary forces in their strategies to destabilise 
rural areas and take control over them. This also outlines the complex role that social 
capital is likely to play in the migration decision under violence. Then any advantage to 
belong to a society and may discourage migration like active participation in community 
activities or high education levels may also turn into a risk factor and encourage 
displacement. 
 
In line with this literature, our model of migration will embed factors linked to violence 
into a framework of expected utility. Furthermore, we will allow the level of violence to 
affect not only directly the well-being of households attached to a given location and, 
hence, their migration decisions, but also the migration incentives associated to other 
factors. This argument, firstly outlined by Morrison and May (1994), has not been fully 
exploited since.2 In contrast to these studies, our micro-data on migrant households and 
local violence allow us to test whether the effects associated to specific migration 
determinants depend on the level of violence.  
 
Impact of welfare programmes on migration 
 
Another important benefit attached to living in a municipality is whether its inhabitants 
receive benefits from welfare programmes. However the literature on the impacts of 
welfare programmes on migration is scant. To our knowledge only one paper by 
Angelucci (2005) investigates the effect of the PROGRESA conditional cash transfer 
programme in Mexico on international labour migration. However, the political and 
economic context of Mexico where communities have experienced large international 
labour migration flows in the past and formed important migration networks in the US is 
very different from Colombia.  
 
Welfare programmes, such as FA, the one we analyze, may affect ambiguously 
household migration decisions in areas receiving them. On one hand they increase the 
attractiveness of municipalities receiving welfare benefits through many channels. Aside 
from increasing household income through cash transfers, these welfare programmes may 
also mitigate aggregate (village) risk by giving poor households a certain source of 
income. They may also have spillover effects on non beneficiary households, for example 
if wages on local labour markets increase following decreases in child labour supply due 
to the programme. All these effects amount to decrease the incentives for household to 
migrate out of their residence municipality.3  On the other hand cash transfers may also 
contribute to relax liquidity constraints of very poor households and increase their 
                                                 
2 The results of Ibanez and al (2005)  suggest that the determinants of displacement are different from those 
of migration. However the two samples they use on displaced households and non migrant households do 
not allow them to test whether migration determinants are modified by the incidence of violence. 
3 Note that the eligibility criteria for the programme is based on a poverty index established for each 
household registered in municipalities 1999. This  precludes households from eligibility if they lived in a 
control municipality in 1999 and, since, have moved into a treated municipality. 
mobility if migration benefits are higher than migration costs. However, their 
conditionality may make them harder to channel into savings for migration. 4   
 
Moreover we expect the programme to affect differently household migration decisions 
depending on their characteristics and environment. In particular the incidence of 
violence varies a lot across municipalities and the programme may affect differently 
migration incentives of households depending on whether they are threatened by violence 
or not. For example, by relaxing cash constraints, the programme may allow some 
households threatened by violence to migrate, whereas the same households would not 
benefit from migrating in a stable environment. Or the programme may discourage 
household migration only if violence incidence is not unduly high. Moreover the design 
of the conditional cash transfer programme introduces some interesting variation in who 
is benefiting most from it. Households with very young children (aged 0 to 6) are eligible 
for the nutrition component if they comply with visiting health centers regularly, whereas 
families with children enrolled in school receive the education component that varies 
depending on the number of children attending primary and secondary school. 
Accordingly, the programme may affect households with fewer children in schooling age 
to a lesser degree than others. Its conditionality, should, however, mitigate this effect as it 
also entails larger costs for families with more children. We will therefore test for 
possible heterogeneous programme impact on migration along a large set of dimensions, 
which includes violence levels, other types of risk such as aggregate risks at village level 
or household exposure to risk, household liquidity constraints and household 
demographic characteristics. 
 
3 Data 
 
We use the large and high quality data set, whose collection was started in 2002 with the 
purpose of evaluating the Familias en Acción programme. The FA survey collected 
                                                 
4The amounts of the subsidy vary by age, being 14,000 pesos (US$6) and 28,000 pesos (US$12) per month 
for 7-11 and 12-17 year old children respectively, conditionally on school attendance. Nutrition is targeted 
by a flat-rate monthly monetary supplement of 46,500 pesos (approximatively US$20) to all beneficiary 
families. 
information on 11,612 households living in 122 (relatively small) representative rural 
municipalities, 57 of which were receiving the programme based on the requisites that 
they had less than 100,000 inhabitants, at least a bank and a minimum level of health and 
education infrastructure and 65 of which were not. Within each municipality, all families 
in the poorest sixtile of the population according to a basic welfare indicator5 and with 
children between 0 and 17 years old, were potential beneficiaries of the programme and 
surveyed for its evaluation. 
 
The first data collection (which we refer to as the baseline data) was done just before the 
start of the new programme.6 For the second data collection, which was executed in 2003, 
we therefore decided to add several modules to the basic and already rich questionnaire. 
In particular, we invested a considerable amount of resources to track down households 
that had moved since the baseline survey and, to these households, a newly designed 
module on mobility was administered. Moreover, we constructed extensive locality 
questionnaires that were administered to three ‘local’ authorities (such as the mayor, the 
programme official and the priest). Finally, it should be mentioned that some basic 
information dated to 1999 exists for all the households in the survey and a set of other 
households that were in the village but had left as of the 2002 data collection.7 
 
The follow up survey to the Familias en Acción database was a success: attrition was 
relatively low at 6%. This was partly due to the mechanisms we put in place to track 
households and partly to low mobility rate between 2002 and 2003 that we now turn to 
describe.  
 
Sample 
 
                                                 
5 The “SISBEN” 1-6, is an indicator collected for all families in Colombia, whose level determines welfare 
entitlements. 
6 The evaluation and the survey were organized by a consortium made of Econometria, IFS and SEI. In 
some of the ‘treatment’ towns, the programme was started by the government before the baseline survey. 
These issues and the baseline data are discussed in detail in Attanasio et al. (2004). 
7 The 2002 sample was obtained by first sampling 21623 households from the 1999 Sisben lists in the 
relevant municipalities. Of these households, on which we have  as set of about 8 variables dated 1999 
more than 11600 were still living in the same village and entered the sample.  
To assess the determinants of the decision to migrate out of municipality we build an 
indicator equal to one if a household has moved out of its municipality of residence 
between the baseline and the follow up surveys, and 0 otherwise. Such information is 
available since, at follow up, the surveyors report whether they are able to interview 
again the households interviewed at baseline and if not, the reason why not.  
 
As shown in the table below, the interviewers “lost” 710 households between the baseline 
and follow up surveys. Among them 435 households are reported as having moved out of 
the village, while for the remaining 275 interviewers were not able to establish the reason 
for non-contact in the follow up. In total, therefore, only 435 households or 3.75% of the 
sample have changed municipality for sure between the baseline and the follow-up 
surveys. Moreover, among the 435 “migrant” households, 114 households were 
eventually tracked by the interviewers and administered a special questionnaire on 
migration. 
Total number of  households 11612   
Migrants out of 
municipalities 
435 
 
Non migrants 
 
11177  
 including:   including: 
Tracked  Non tracked Don’t know Changed location 
within municipality 
others 
114 321 275 1316  
 
Concerning the very low mobility rate we observe between the baseline and follow up 
surveys, a few remarks are important to note. First, if we add the remaining 275 
households that were not surveyed again at follow up for unknown reasons and assume 
they left the village of residence we find migration rates at around 6%. However, Table 1 
shows that these 275 households are significantly different from the sample of migrants, 
which surely reflects that some of these households have not migrated out of their 
municipality of origin, or other more complex selection issues. Therefore we chose not to 
add these households to the sample of migrants. 
 
Second, we may suspect the FA  sample to be not a fully random sample of very poor 
households as more than 40 % of the households that were present in the municipalities 
in 1999 for the SISBEN survey were no longer available in July 2002, when the baseline 
survey of the FA started. As we are effectively observing a sample of ‘stayers’ it might 
be that mobility for them is particularly low. This might explain why the observed 3.75 % 
mobility between baseline and follow-up was less than past mobility rates. Not 
controlling for this source of unobserved heterogeneity in our migration model would 
result in biased estimates, an issue we will address in the next Section. 
 
Third, we have to bear in mind that these migration flows are not representative of all 
migration flows in Colombia but only of the mobility among the poorest households in 
Colombia targeted by the programme. They are likely to be liquidity constrained, an issue 
that will be addressed in Section 6. Migration costs reported by migrants to the 
interviewers are sizeable: median costs are around 50,000 pesos and mean costs around 
103,037 pesos, which represent respectively 21% and 43% of the average monthly 
household income in treated municipalities at baseline (the whole distribution of 
migration costs is represented in Figure 1). 8 Moreover, to finance their migration, 2/3 of 
households used their own funds, 1/3 was helped by friends or relative and, what is 
remarkable is that none relied on any kind of credit or loan. It is thus not too surprising to 
observe very low migration rates as these very poor households have no access to credit 
markets to finance their migration. 
 
We believe, however, that these migration flows are particularly interesting for policy 
makers since the well-being of the very poor households in our sample is likely to be 
strongly affected by their migration decisions. 
 
The FA data also allow us to identify 1316 households that have changed location 
between the baseline and follow up surveys within their municipality of residence. 
However, we focus only on household decision to leave the municipality of residence for 
                                                 
8 These estimates are based on answers given by the 114 migrant households successfully tracked for the 
follow-up survey. 
two main reasons. First, our data do not give us information on the levels of violence 
across different parts of the municipality and the FA programme is administrated 
homogenously everywhere in each municipality, such that we cannot test the main 
predictions of the model concerning the effect of violence and of welfare programmes for 
within municipality mobility decisions. Second, on a priori grounds, these two types of 
migration decisions have different economic determinants since migration costs and 
benefits involved are not the same. This is in line with what households report on their 
main motivation to migrate, as described in the table below:  
Main reason for having migrated
between baseline and follow-up 
 
 
Households 
who migrated 
within their 
municipality 
(1)  
% of answers 
Households 
who migrated 
out of their 
municipality 
(2) 
% of answers 
Violence 1.9 14.9 
For job related reasons 16.9 54.4 
To find better accomodation 22.8 2.6 
To live closer to relatives 8.3 14.0 
To live closer to the centre of 
the municipality  1.0           0.0 
To live closer to college 3.8 3.6 
Others 45.3 10.5 
Total 100 100 
One has to be cautious, however, while interpreting these figures as the 114 successfully 
tracked households that give an answer in column (2) are only a minority of the 435 
households who migrated out of their municipality of origin. It is likely that most of the 
households who were not successfully tracked are the ones who did not want to leave 
their address to their neighbours or relatives because they were particularly threatened by 
violence. Therefore the sizeable proportion of reasons related to violence (14.9%) may 
still underestimate the proportion of motives related to violence for households who 
migrated out of their municipality of residence. In the remaining of the paper, we will 
assess the relative importance of violence in explaining migration decisions of the whole 
sample. 
Therefore, the sample we use in our final analysis comprises 435 households who have 
clearly moved out of their municipality of residence -hereafter called “migrants”- as well 
as 11177 households who have not, the “non migrants”. We summarise the characteristics 
of these two sub-samples and their main differences in Table 2. 
  
4 Determinants of household migration 
 
The model 
 
Our first objective is to assess the relative importance of different determinants in 
explaining the household i decision to leave its municipality of residence j between 
baseline and follow-up, with a particular focus on the effects of violence incidence and of 
policy interventions like the FA programme. To do so, we estimated equation (1) using a 
standard Probit model allowing for possible correlated decisions within village as 
follows: 
 { }1 2 3 j 4 ij1 'Violence 'X 0ij j ijY Treatα α α α ε= + + + + >  (1) 
where : 
jTreat    = 1   if treated municipality 
= 0  otherwise 
jViolence  vector of control variables for violence level in village j at baseline 
ijX  vector of control variables for household and village characteristics 
at baseline 
ijε  error term, correlated across households within municipalities. 
Note that α2 and α3 yield unbiased estimates of, respectively, the programme impact and 
violence impact under the assumption that, conditional on observed characteristics, ijX , 
there are no unobserved factors affecting migration that are correlated to these variables. 
Even though we cannot test for this assumption, we should stress that although the 
programme was not allocated randomly across municipalities, control municipalities have 
been chosen so to be as similar as possible to the treated municipalities.9 Moreover we 
control for many observable variables, both at the municipality and household level. 
However, as mentioned above we cannot exclude that households in our sample have 
                                                 
9 The only “observable” differences are the presence of a bank, and a minimum of education and health 
infrastructure in treated municipalities that are necessary for the implementation of the programme. 
been selected along unobserved characteristics that also explain their subsequent 
relatively low mobility rate. If selection is systematically related to ijε , estimating 
equation (1) on the sample at hand can result in inconsistent estimators of the parameters 
of interest.  
 
To address this issue we estimate with maximum likelihood a bi-variate Probit model 
with censored selection by estimating equation (1) simultaneously with the following 
selection equation: 
 { }2 ij21 'X 0ij ijY vγ= + >  (2) 
where ijY is observed only when 2 1ijY =  and 2i jY  is equal to 0 if the household was in the 
1999 survey but not in the 2002 survey and equal to 0 if it is still in the FA survey in 
2002. Thereby we control for possible correlation between the error terms of equations 
(1) and (2) by estimating : 
 corr( , )ij ijvρ ε=  (3) 
The variables we use in the selection equation come mainly from the base SISBEN 
survey that gathers general information on households that were registered in 1999, such 
as the type of social insurance they have, their size and number of children below 18 
years old, the age and education level of the head and whether he is directly affiliated to a 
social insurance. A summary of these variables is presented below: 
 
Variable description Mean St.dev. Max 
 from SISBEN survey:    
affiliated~s affiliated to social security 5.47%   
urban lives in urban area  49.35%   
educ2 head has primary education level  60.54%   
educ3 head has secondary education level or more 7.30%   
female head is female 25.52%   
persfami household size 5.05 2.12 32
no_under17 number children  2.63 1.55 19
 from the Police:   
displaced number of displaced people per 10,000 inhabitants 506.64 881.86 4165.85
victims Victims of massacre per 10,000 inhabitants 0.14 0.49 2.62
sequest number of kidnapped people per 10,000 inhabitants  1.02 2.45 18.76
Notes number of observations is 19148 
 
In order for the model to be well-identified, the selection equation should have at least 
one variable that we can exclude from the main probit equation.10 For this purpose, we 
use an additional data set from the Department of National Planning that provides us with 
information on violence levels in each municipality in years prior to the SISBEN survey, 
based on reports by the Police. We use three “valid” instruments that have explanatory 
power in the selection equation and can conceivably be omitted from the main equation: 
the numbers of victims of massacre, of displaced people and of kidnapped people per 
10,000 inhabitants in each municipality. Our identifying assumption is that such pre-1999 
information does not explain migration decisions between the baseline and follow up 
surveys once controlling for very detailed data on violence incidence in the two years 
preceding the survey and many other control variables at baseline survey we have in the 
FA survey.11 In the table below we check that high levels of violence have decreased 
strongly and significantly the probability to remain in the sample of households 
interviewed in 2002, and that this probability is also positively associated to living in an 
urban part of the municipality, to being affiliated to the social security, to larger 
household, larger proportion of children, higher education levels of household head and 
to having a male household head. The latter may be related to high violence incidence in 
Colombia that has increased the number of female headed households who are more 
likely to move out of their municipality of residence. 
Determinants of the selection equation 
 Coefficients Std. Err. z statistic 
affiliated~s 0.112 0.041 2.76 
urban 0.046 0.019 2.47 
educ2 0.031 0.020 1.55 
educ3 0.233 0.038 6.07 
female -0.068 0.023 -2.98 
persfami 0.143 0.021 6.7 
persfami_sq -0.008 0.002 -4.95 
no_under17 0.140 0.025 5.67 
no_under17~q -0.012 0.003 -3.65 
displaced 0.000 0.000 -13.29 
victims -0.039 0.019 -2.03 
sequest -0.033 0.004 -8.46 
_cons -0.698 0.055 -12.77 
                                                 
10 Otherwise the model is identified only by a functional form. 
11These variables are discussed extensively in the remaining part of the paper 
Notes: Coefficients obtained with a Probit model, number of observations 19148 
 
Estimating equations (1) and (2) jointly by maximum likelihood, we find that the 
coefficient of correlation between the error terms is not significantly different from 0 
(with a Wald test of independence rejecting its significance at 31% level), such that we 
do not need worrying about possible selection problems. Therefore, for the rest of our 
paper, we estimate equation (1) separately from equation (2).  
 
Main results 
 
All results we discuss below are presented in Table 3.  
Apart from household size, few household demographic variables determine significantly 
migration decision. We find that larger households have a lower probability of migrating 
out their municipality of residence, which is easy to understand since large households 
have important migration costs. We also find that households whose head is single are 
more likely to migrate. This reflects a number of reasons ranging from possible weaker 
ties in the municipality of residence or lower migration costs in the absence of bargaining 
problems, to other factors such as the degree of risk aversion for which we could not find 
better control in our data.12 
 
The effects associated to education levels of household heads and spouses are not 
individually nor jointly significant, as tested in specifications (2) and (3). This remains 
true when we aggregate the education levels into fewer categories as shown in column 
(1). The absence of significant effects associated to education is somehow puzzling if 
migration is determined mainly by job related motives. We cannot estimate a selection 
model a la Borjas (1987) where migrants choose to migrate where the returns to human 
capital are higher since we do not observe the destination areas of most of migrants and 
cannot hope to know the returns to human capital. However, one might argue that 
education levels of the head and the spouse do not capture well enough job related 
                                                 
12 We also tried adding the proportion of total household consumption spent in lottery to capture 
heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion across households. But this variable was not significant and suffers 
from many missing answers. Therefore we preferred not to keep this variable in the main set of control 
variables. 
motives of these very poor households who are mainly working in agriculture. Therefore 
we added some control variables for occupations of heads and spouses in specification 
(4). We find that being a self-employed worker, an employer or employed diminishes the 
probability to migrate, as we can easily explain with job related motives. We cannot, 
however, over interpret these findings since occupations of heads and spouses just before 
migrating are surely endogenous to household migration decisions. Therefore we present 
the results with these additional controls for occupation separately from the others in 
column (4). 
 
One of the strongest estimated effects is associated to the type of insurance from which 
households benefit. Having a private health insurance -which is most often attached to a 
good job in formal sector-, decreases strongly the probability of migrating by around 3.5 
percent points (this is to be compared to the observed migration rate around 3.7%). 
Having a subisidised “second best” type of insurance discourages household mobility but 
to a lesser extent. These results suggest that insurance plays a large role in migration 
decisions of the vulnerable housejholds of our sample. However this could also reflect 
that risk averse households are also less mobile, an issue we will address more in depth in 
the last Section. 
 
Marginal effect  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 if EPS =unsubsidized health 
insurance, “best” type 
-3.553 
(1.090)*** 
-3.497 
(1.235)*** 
-3.533 
(1.200)*** 
-2.844 
(1.153)** 
-3.546 
(1.202)*** 
1 if ARS (2nd best type of insurance) -1.282 -1.056 -1.148 -1.049 -1.178 
 (0.575)** (0.661) (0.639)* (0.627)* (0.630)* 
1 if Vinculado (3rd best type) -0.696 -0.424 -0.565 -0.365 -0.611 
 (0.648) (0.728) (0.708) (0.677) (0.700) 
Notes : Marginal effects of a Probit model are reported in percentage points. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Moreover, very significant and large effects are associated to the type of property rights 
households have on their residence. On one hand, paying something for living in a house 
(either a rent, mortgage or having a house in usufruct) increases household mobility as 
compared to owning the house, the missing category. This result is quite intuitive as 
ownership reflects household intentions to stay, only if migration is not entirely forced. 
Otherwise we would expect the richest households who own fixed assets to be more at 
risk from violence. On the other hand, households who occupy a house without legal 
agreement have a lower probability to migrate, which could be simply explained by the 
difficulties migrants may face in finding similar informal agreements in new destination 
areas. Concerning the quality of houses that is captured by the types of wall material or 
phone, we do not find any effect on household mobility. 
 
Marginal effect  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 if house is rented or in mortgage, 0 oth 1.970 2.183 2.012 1.254 2.021 
 (0.554)*** (0.614)*** (0.599)*** (0.673)* (0.600)*** 
1 if house is occupied without legal 
agreement, 0 oth 
-2.998 -3.378 -3.374 -3.364 -3.363 
 (1.681)* (1.598)** (1.592)** (1.363)** (1.591)** 
1 if house is in usufruct, 0 oth 0.865 1.054 1.020 1.092 1.016 
 (0.374)** (0.390)*** (0.383)*** (0.370)*** (0.385)*** 
Notes : Marginal effects of a Probit model are reported in percentage points. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Economic differences across villages are reflected by the negative impact on migration of 
hourly wages in rural parts of the municipality, in line with Harris and Todaro’s 
predictions. However, its magnitude is rather small since increasing hourly wages in rural 
parts of municipalities by 1,000 pesos (which represents more than 1.5 standard 
deviations from the mean hourly wages in our sample) decreases the probability to 
migrate by less than 0.5 percent point, as shown below. 
 
Marginal effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
hourly wage in urban part 
of municipality 
0.007 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
hourly wage in rural part 
of municipality 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)** 
Notes : Marginal effects of a Probit model are reported per 1,000 pesos. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
We find that geographic factors make some areas more attractive than others. The altitude 
of the municipality increases the probability to migrate out of the municipality, as returns 
to agriculture in the mountains are lower and the access to markets more difficult.. 
Moreover, to capture better regional imbalances and other unobserved factors that may 
affect migration and differ across regions we also embed four regional dummy variables 
into the migration equation, as well as the size of population living in the center and 
peripheral parts of the municipalities.13 We find that the size of population in rural part of 
municipalities decreases the probability to migrate and that households living in the 
Oriental area and in the Pacific area have a lower probability to migrate out of their 
municipality as compared to households living in the Atlantic areas, the missing category.   
 
Moreover, we expect the very poor households in our sample to be sensitive to the 
availability of public infrastructure like schools and hospitals that are entered as 
additional explanatory variables. We also include the proportion of households with 
sewage system or piped water in the municipality of residence, as well as the number of 
pharmacies and health centres as they may reflect the costs of access to these services.14 
We do not find strong impacts associated to public infrastructure. The number of schools 
in urban parts of municipalities has a very small and, as expected, negative impact of 
migration, which is only significant at 10% level in some specifications. The number of 
“public puestos”, which, in spite of their number, may indicate  a rather low quality of 
health care in municipalities, increases household mobility. We also tested for the 
robustness of the other results without these extra variables in column (2), as some effects 
were difficult to understand such as the positive impact on migration of the number of 
schools in rural parts of municipalities shown in column (4) only. 
                                                 
13As the latter also capture dynamic effects linked to agglomeration in specific areas resulting from past 
migrations, they are potentially endogenous and we need to be cautious while interpreting their effects. 
14Note that there are several types of public health centres in Colombia: in general, hospitals are bigger than 
other health centres called “public centros” or “public puestos”. The latter are mostly located in rural areas 
and, sometimes, comprise only a nurse. However, the quality of hospitals is very heterogeneous across 
municipalities. 
 An important determinant of migration emphasized by the recent literature is the presence 
of networks. Although we do not have a direct measure of household networks in our 
data, we include proxies for the level of social capital in the village that are likely to 
affect migration decisions in complex ways. On one hand social capital may be 
considered as a positive amenity that increases the well-being to live in some 
municipalities and may be viewed as a social asset that is not easily transferable to 
another community. On the other hand, social capital may be correlated to the presence of 
strong networks, which may facilitate migration by decreasing its costs. Results presented 
in column (5) of Table 3 show that social capital, measured by the proportion of of 
women in the municipality participating in collective activities, is not significant once we 
control by all the other municipality characteristics.15 Moreover, when we added 
variables measuring the level and evolution of trust in the municipalities in the recent past 
as reported by three main leaders surveyed in each municipality, they were not 
significant. This may simply reflect the fact that these variables are strongly correlated to 
the other village level characteristics, in particular to the different dimensions of violence 
we control for. This was confirmed when we dropped some municipality level variables 
and more proxies for social capital became significant. However, household level 
variables measuring mother’s participation in collective activities were never significant 
and are  therefore not reported. 
 
As we mentioned several times, one of the main aims of this paper is to assess the effect 
of the FA programme on migration. The Table below shows that the programme 
decreases the probability of migration. However these estimates are statistically different 
from zero only in the specifications where we add more control for municipality 
infrastructure and for the education level of the parents, as in columns (3) to (5). The 
effect of FA is not negligible since receiving the programme decreases by around 1 
percentage point the probability to migrate as compared to the observed migration rate 
                                                 
15We use a detailed module of the questionnaire applied to household mothers, which describes 
participation of women in political, religious, sport, neighbourhood or other types of associations. As a 
proxy for social capital we used the proportion of women involved in each type of collective activity as 
well as the proportion of women involved in any of these groups. 
equal to 3.75%. Interestingly, the magnitude of the programme impact is comparable to 
the magnitude of the impact of violence due to the presence of illegal armed groups. 
Hence the FA welfare programme contributes to stabilise the situation in some 
municipalities by mitigating migration flows due to violence. 
 
Additionally we tested for possible interaction effects of the programme with 
demographic characteristics of the households, as they determine the maximum amount 
of benefits they are entitled to. But we could not find any significant effects associated to 
these interactions, which is, perhaps, not too surprising given the conditionality of the 
programme. 
 
A further concern was that the lack of significant impact of the programme effect in some 
specifications like in columns (1) and (2) could be driven by some misspecification of the 
programme effect. In order to assess the programme’s impact on migration as accurately 
as possible, we also exploited an interesting feature of the implementation of the 
programme that started at different dates in different municipalities. As a consequence 
some municipalities have received more payments at follow up. We captured this 
“intensity” effect of the programme by estimating the following equation (2): 
{ }1 2 3 j 4 ij1 'V 'Xij j ijY Number iolenceα α α α ε= + + + +  
where the variable jNumber  measures the number of payments received in municipality j 
at follow up survey. Table 4 shows that intensity effects of the programme are only 
weakly significant at 10 % level when we use the full set of control variables at 
municipality level as in columns (1) and (3)16, which motivated the choice of the 
specification presented in equation (1). 
 
To assess the impact of violence on migration decisions, different sources of information 
from the FA data have been used. The first type of variables comes from the part of the 
                                                 
16We also entered the number of payments in a quadratic relationship, but the squared term was not 
significant. Furthermore, we could not exclude that the effect of the programme on migration might play 
beyond its intensity effect like a “fixed” effect, for example if it entails positive externalities that 
discourage households to migrate. Therefore we added a fixed effect “TREAT” among the set of 
explanatory variables of the equation above, which turned out to be not significant. 
FA questionnaire on public infrastructure that gives information on the presence of 
taskforce desertion and taskforce strike due to violence in any health center (IPS) of the 
municipality. Secondly we use three variables that describe the perception by the 
surveyors of some problems linked to violence when they visited the municipalities. 
These are three dummy variables equal to one if, respectively, there was a curfew, if there 
were some paramilitaries/FARC/or ELN forces, or if there were some problems related to 
violence in the municipalities. The last type of variables measuring the levels of violence 
comes from the special module of the questionnaire applied to the municipality leaders 
who mention whether some displaced households have left and joined the municipality 
during the year before the baseline survey. Table 2 shows that migrant households live in 
more violent municipalities where health centers are more often affected by violence, 
where curfews, problems of public order and illegal armed groups are more frequently 
reported, and from where more displaced households have left in the recent past, as 
represented also in Figure 2. 
 
The Table below shows that significant positive effects associated to the presence of 
illegal armed groups in the municipality in specifications (2) to (4), as well as associated 
to the number of displaced households who left the municipalities in the past whatever 
the specification chosen. Moreoever, when we drop most of the controls for 
municipalities as in specification (2) we found that problems of violence in municipalities 
leading to taskforce desertion in health center become weakly significant, whereas 
presence of curfew is significant in most other specifications. All these results show that 
violence plays a significant role in explaining household migration and that migration 
flows are closely linked to displacement process. 
Marginal effects  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 if lives in treated municipality -0.648 -0.628 -0.836 -1.124 -1.029 
 (0.499) (0.495) (0.505)* (0.402)*** (0.539)* 
Number of displaced households  0.034 0.039 0.032 0.024 0.031 
 (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)** (0.011)*** 
curfew 1.110 0.208 0.939 1.143 0.902 
 (0.550)** (0.603) (0.567)* (0.527)** (0.565) 
presence of illegal armed groups 0.821 1.282 0.969 1.364 0.774 
 (0.512) (0.526)** (0.530)* (0.437)*** (0.514) 
1 if suffered taskforce desertion\0 0.732 1.107 0.512 0.013 0.675 
 (0.582) (0.626)* (0.597) (0.551) (0.616) 
Notes : Marginal effects of a Probit model are reported in percentage points. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 
We also tested for possible quadratic effects associated to violence incidence. The 
negative coefficient associated to the square of number of displaced people turned out to 
be weakly significant at 10 % level or not significant depending on the set of controls 
which motivated our choice of a linear specification. 
 
5 Does violence incidence modify migration incentives ? 
 
Does violence incidence interact with the programme effect ? 
 
To test for heterogeneous impact of the programme, we allow the effect associated to the 
programme measured by 2α  in equation 1 to depend on the level of violence in each 
municipality as follows: 
2
2 2
2
(low level)
(Violence)
(high level)
α
α α
α

= =   by estimating separately equation (1) 
for municipalities with high and low incidence of violence. 
Then, to gain in efficiency, we parametise the function 3(Violence)α as:  
2 20 21 j'*Violenceα α α= +  
Hence the model becomes : 
{ }1 2 j 3 j 4 5 ij1 Treat  ' Treat *Violence ' Violence ' Xij j j ijY β β β β β ε= + + + + +  
where: jTreat*Violence j  = jViolence  if household lives in village j receiving the 
programme 
= 0  otherwise 
and the same assumptions as in equation (1) hold for the estimation 
 
The table below shows that the negative effect of the programme is only significant at 
conventional levels in the villages where the incidence violence is low, as indicated by 
the absence of illegal armed groups (FARC, ELN or paramilitaries), which correspond to 
columns (4) to (6).17 This result is robust whatever the specification chosen. The 
magnitude of the effect of the programme is large, with estimates lying between –0.5 
percent points and -2.2 percent points. 
 
 High level of violence  Low level of violence  
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
treat -0.543 -0.460 -0.737 -1.185 -1.382 -1.739 
 (0.685) (0.661) (0.537) (0.482)** (0.816)* (0.532)*** 
Obs. 6464 6464 5099 3370 3370 2661 
Notes: marginal impacts are reported in percentage points with robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(2) & (5) with more controls for municipality characteristics 
(3) & (6) with more controls for occupation of household heads and spouses 
 
In the next table we define low and high levels of violence using the information we have 
on the number of displaced households who left the village in the past. High levels are 
defined for municipalities with at least 5 displaced households the year preceding the 
baseline survey, which corresponds to the highest quartile of the distribution. 
 High  level  Low level   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
treat 0.435 -1.708 0.605 -0.365 -0.707 -1.375 
 (1.386) (2.332) (1.836) (0.496) (0.523) (0.463)*** 
Obs 2246 2246 1673 7180 7180 5771 
 
Once we parametise the effect of the programme as a function of this continuous proxy 
for violence, we obtain a couple of significant effects associated to the interaction of the 
programme effect, 3β , with violence levels that are displayed below (the marginal effects 
associated to all explanatory variables are presented in Table 5):  
                                                 
17We only present here the main results concerning the effect of the programme but we control for the same 
variables as specified above. 
Probit estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Programme effect -18.323 -26.097 -40.390 -26.264 
 (9.906)* (11.455)** (10.455)*** (12.071)** 
Interaction effect of 
Programme*violence 
0.611 0.780 0.674 0.967 
 (0.274)** (0.260)*** (0.282)** (0.320)*** 
Violence effect 0.493 0.382 0.346 0.401 
 (0.159)*** (0.152)** (0.141)** (0.159)** 
observations 8837 8837 7078 8837 
Notes : The coefficients multiplied by 100 are displayed with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Violence incidence is measured by the number of displaced households who left the municipality. 
Column (1) is with fewer municipality control variables than in column (2). Column (3) adds the controls 
for occupations of household heads, column (4) adds controls for social capital 
 
In all specification we find that receiving the programme decreases significantly the 
probability to migrate and that the degree of violence counteracts this effect (here we 
present the results from specifications 2 to 5 only since specification 1 is very similar to 
2). Moreover, the programme effect is attenuated even further in municipalities where 
violence incidence is high, as shown by the positive effect associated to the interaction of 
violence level with the programme effect. We note also that this interaction effect is 
always strongly significant. 
 
To assess the magnitude of these effects, we used these estimates to compute the change 
in the probability to migrate due to the programme effect and its interactions with 
violence at the mean characteristics of the sample. Figure 3 shows that the negative effect 
of the programme becomes less important the higher the degree of violence, as measured 
by the number of displaced households in the past. The implied change is between -2 
percent points in municipalities with very low levels of violence and + 0.9 with high level 
of violence. However, positive effects only affect a minority of municipalities with 
unduly high level of violence. The figure remains similar whatever the set of control 
variables we choose. We then performed the same computations but adding to the 
programme impact and its interactions with violence the direct impact of past 
displacement on migration. Figure 4 shows that, for the big majority of treated villages, 
the negative effect of the programme more than offsets the effect of violence. However, 
the total effect becomes positive when more than 20 households have left the village in 
the past, which corresponds to violence levels observed in the 10% most violent 
municipalities of our sample.  
 
Does violence incidence modify other economic incentives to migrate ? 
 
It is also questionable whether violence affects similarly migration incentives of 
households with different characteristics. This is for example the case when households 
are displaced by violence, as outlined above following Ibanez and Velez (2005). To 
address this issue, we interact the proxies for violence discussed above with household 
characteristics. 
 
We did not find any significant effects associated to the interactions of violence with 
socio-economic characteristics like education levels of the head and the spouse, living in 
an isolated rural part of the municipality or working in agriculture, contrary to what we 
would have expected if these households were more threatened by violence. Nor did we 
find any significant interaction effects of violence levels with household participation in 
collective activities, contrary to what we would expect if households with strong social 
connections were strategically targeted by illegal armed groups. Hence households in our 
sample seem to behave differently than if their mobility were entirely forced. One 
possible explanation for these findings is that the households in our sample that are 
eligible for the FA programme are the most deprived households living in rural areas of 
Colombia. This is thus maybe not too surprising if illegal armed groups did not 
particularly target them in their strategy to destabilise rural areas. 
 
Instead, we found that households with larger size, fewer children, and whose head 
(spouse) is older (younger) respond more strongly to the level of violence by leaving their 
municipality of residence, as shown in Table 6. This result suggests that large households 
who would not, otherwise, have migrated due to high migration costs have been pushed 
to migrate out of municipalities where violence incidence is very high. 
 
6 Understanding the effect of the welfare programme in a violent context 
 
So far we have shown that welfare programmes such as FA have different impacts on 
household migration across villages that depend on violence incidence but the reason 
why it is the case is not clear. We see at least three explanations for this fact, which have 
different policy implications. First, cash transfers increase household income, which 
tends to attach beneficiary households to their municipality of residence. If this is the 
case, this effect should persist as long as the programme is not universally implemented. 
Second, receiving welfare benefits helps relaxing household liquidity constraints, which 
may increase migration if liquidity constraints are binding for migration decisions. This is 
likely to be the case in municipalities with high level of violence where lots of inhabitants 
wish to migrate. Third, the welfare programme may mitigate different types of risk in the 
municipalities receiving the programme, thereby, affecting all household decisions 
coping with risk, including migration. This section tests for the relevancy of such stories 
by studying how migration responds to other types of risk and to household liquidity 
constraints. 
 
How do different types of risk affect household migration ? 
 
The main results in Section 3 have shown that households having formal insurance are 
less mobile than households without and that high levels of violence push households to 
leave their municipality of residence. In this section we want to examine more generally 
the link between household migration and their exposition to different types of risks. 
 
We use detailed data on other shocks that affected negatively household income during 
the year of the survey such as death, illness of a household member, business or crop 
losses, losses due to fire, flood, other natural disaster, violence, robbery or displacement. 
We also checked the robustness of our results by using indicators for shocks occurring in 
the two years preceding the survey. The table below shows that in the two years 
preceding the survey households have been more frequently exposed to negative income 
shocks due to crop losses (27%) or to illnesses of some of their members (17%) than to 
other negative shocks. 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if household 
income was affected by: 
Shocks in 2002 Shocks occurring 
in 2000/2001/2002 
 Obs Mean Std. Mean Std. 
death 8837 0.025 0.156 0.054 0.226 
illness 8837 0.104 0.305 0.169 0.375 
Crop loss 8837 0.161 0.368 0.268 0.443 
Business loss 8837 0.014 0.119 0.025 0.156 
Fire, flood or other natural disaster 8837 0.016 0.126 0.036 0.187 
Violence, robbery or displacement 8837 0.013 0.112 0.031 0.173 
 
We also want to assess the relative importance of aggregate shocks at village level in 
explaining household migration, as insurance mechanisms within villages may also play 
an important role in mitigating idiosyncratic shocks affecting household income. If such 
mechanisms exist, household migration may respond more strongly to aggregate negative 
shocks due to bad weather or violence in municipalities than to idiosyncratic household 
shocks such as shocks due to illness or death of some household members. However, 
migrating out of the village may also lead to loosing the benefits of mutual informal 
insurance within village. To control for aggregate shocks at village level, we build the 
proportions of households in each village having been exposed to different types of 
income losses in 2002. 
 
We also use the questions on income expectations of households, in order to measure 
how household migration responds to exposure to risk (ex-ante). Our measure of risk 
exposure is constructed as follows. We first construct the variance of expected income as 
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where uY  is the household’s expectation of next month’s maximum 
income, lY  is the household’s expectation of next month’s minimum income, and  Y  is 
the average of the two. As this measure is unit-dependent, we standardise it and use 
instead the coefficient of variation of income log YYcv Y
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 This measure of risk has a number of advantages that distinguishes it from previous 
measures that have been used. The first is that the household head’s expectation of next 
month’s maximum and minimum income levels is not a function of measures taken by 
the household to mitigate the income risk they face.18 This is because the expectations 
relate to two hypothetical extreme situations that the household may face, rather than the 
situations that the household itself believes it will face. Two extreme scenarios are 
presented to the household head, on which (s)he reports expected income under both: that 
the member(s) of the household who want to work obtain a good/bad job (alternatively, 
there is a good/bad harvest) next month. It is the first question of its kind that tries to 
elicit individuals’ own perception of ex-ante risk in surveys such as these. We also 
averaged this proxy for each municipality to obtain a proxy for aggregate expectations in 
each village. 
 
Lastly, we used a proxy for risk attitude measured as the share of household budget 
devoted to lottery and its average in the village.19 We summarise the two proxies for risk 
exposure and attitude below. We note that the number of missing observations for the 
variable measuring the perceptions of risk is quite high. 
Variables Obs Mean St.deviation Minimum Maximum 
  
Share of budget in lottery 8836 0.006 0.019 0.000 0.380 
Log of coefficient of variation 5986 -0.220 0.243 -3.045 -0.001 
Moreover, when added to the set of explanatory variables, we found that household and 
village level variables capturing risk exposure and attitude are not significant in 
explaining household migration. Therefore we do not keep them among the final set of 
control variables for household and village level shocks. 
 
As shown below a shock due to death in 2002 increases the probability to migrate out of 
the municipality increases by more than 2.1 percentage points, which is a very large 
impact as compared to the 3.5% migration rate observed between baseline and follow-up. 
                                                 
18If it were, one would risk obtaining an under-estimate of the ex-ante risk facing the household. 
19 In the future we hope to be able to enrich this set of proxies for risk, in particular those related to attitude 
towards risk either at individual or village levels, using the results of experimental risk-sharing games we 
are implementing in all villages in our sample. 
Moreover, a negative shock on household income due to violence increases the 
probability to migrate by 3 percentage points. The shocks that are the most frequent such 
as crop losses or illness of a household member do not have significant impacts on 
household mobility. If we now consider the shocks that have occurred earlier in the past, 
we find weaker impacts on migration that are significant at less than 10% level, as 
presented in Table 7. This motivates why we only keep in our final specification the 
proxies for shocks in the years preceding the survey as presented in column (2) below. 
 (1) (2) 
household shock: death02 2.137 2.442 
 (0.929)** (0.924)*** 
household shock: illness02 0.194  
 (0.594)  
household shock: croploss02 -0.508  
 (0.452)  
household shock: busloss02 0.460  
 (1.474)  
household shock: fireflood02 -1.457  
 (1.793)  
household shock: violence02 3.067 3.218 
 (1.173)*** (1.160)*** 
% of households in village with death 02  -0.344 
  (0.136)** 
%hhs in vill. with income losses due to viol 02  -0.250 
  (0.144)* 
Observations 8837 8837 
Notes : Marginal effects of a Probit model are reported in percentage points. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Moreover we find little evidence for a story of full insurance within the village, as when 
village level shocks have significant impacts, these impacts decrease household 
migration, as shown in column (2) above. However, in absence of mutual insurance 
mechanisms within villages it is likely that households would diversify risk by sending 
some of their members away rather than moving as a whole, which cannot be tested with 
our actual data set.20 
 
The main results related to the programme and violence impacts and their interaction 
discussed in Section 5 are remarkably robust when adding additional control variables for 
past negative shocks affecting household income, as shown in Table 7. We also find that 
receiving the programme benefits does not fully compensate for the negative shocks on 
household income due to violence or death in the year preceding the survey. 
 
Lastly we examined whether receiving the programme plays as an insurance mechanism 
in poor villages which would attenuate the effects of different negative shocks on 
household migration. To do so, we interacted the programme effect with the variables 
capturing the different types of risks affecting household income either at the village or 
household levels. We found little evidence for such insurance mechanisms as 
heterogeneous impacts of the programme on migration along these other dimensions 
turned out to be not significant at conventional levels. 
 
How do liquidity constraints affect migration decisions ? 
 
Another mechanism that may explain the impact of the programme on migration could be 
through relaxing the liquidity constraints of poor households who have to pay for high 
migration costs, as described in Section 3. The evidence we found in Section 5 on 
positive interaction effects of the programme in municipalities with high level of violence 
is consistent with such a story. This would also explain why negative shocks on 
household income such as crop losses or losses due to flood, fire or natural disaster do 
not push households out their villages or residence. If liquidity constraints are binding for 
migration decisions,  we would expect wealthier households to be more likely to migrate, 
which is what we now turn to examine. 
 
                                                 
20 We are waiting for a new wave of data that will allow us to identify where household members have 
migrated between the first and the second follow-up surveys.  
The questionnaire includes several proxies for household wealth as it has detailed data on 
the value of house and land owned by the households, on the amount of their debts they 
incurred to buy these assets and on other debts as well as on their stock of savings. While 
interpreting our results we have to keep in mind, however, that the stocks of assets or 
savings at any given date are likely to be endogenous to other life-cycle decisions such as 
migration. Therefore we keep these results separate from the main results. We could also 
consider other variables as proxies for household wealth such as education levels and 
occupation of household heads. Our previous results have shown that having a job 
increases the probability to migrate but that education levels of household heads have no 
significant impacts. However, these variables also capture other job related migration 
motives that are difficult to disentangle from the effect of liquidity constraints. 
 
Column (1) of the table below shows that the net value of household wealth, which 
includes assets and savings net debts, does not have a significant effect on household 
migration, contrary to what we would have expected if households were liquidity 
constrained. We were worried, however, about possible downwards bias of this estimate 
if some negative shocks on household income that we are not controlling for, explain 
both savings desaccumulation during the years preceeding the survey and migration 
decisions. In order to have an indicator of permanent household wealth we use in column 
(2) the value of permanent assets (house and land) net of debts and find a positive 
significant effect associated to household wealth. If we use, instead, the net amount of 
savings we find a negative effect associated to household wealth that is weakly 
significant, as presented in column (3). However, as the negative effect of net savings 
may also reflect the effects of household risk aversion, we prefer the specification shown 
in column (2) where we only use the net value of house and land property as a proxy for 
permanent wealth. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
net wealth 0.033    
 (0.021)    
household shock: violence02 2.978 2.972 2.939 3.727 
 (1.208)** (1.208)** (1.205)** (1.286)*** 
household shock: death02 2.122 2.102 2.248 1.812 
 (0.933)** (0.936)** (0.932)** (0.970)* 
Net value of property  0.039  0.014 
  (0.019)**  (0.027) 
Net value of ppty interacted with death02    0.076 
    (0.030)** 
Net value of ppty interacted with viol02    -0.289 
    (0.142)** 
Net savings   -0.159  
   (0.097)*  
Observations 8837 8837 8837 8837 
Notes: marginal effects are reported in percentage points. 
Standard errors in parenthesis : *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Effects of value of property and wealth are per 10*e8 pesos. 
Furthermore we tested  whether wealthier households migrate less as a response to 
income shocks we observe with our data as they can  smooth consumption by having 
more easily access to credit markets or by using their stock of savings or assets. Only two 
interaction terms between wealth and income shocks turned out to be significant as 
shown in column (4). But the opposite wealth effects we find for households affected by 
violence or death are difficult to explain. Moreover, the negative impact of violence on 
migration of wealthy households stands in contrast to what we would expect if migration 
was completely forced.  
 
7 Conclusion 
 
We have shown that household migration decisions respond strongly and positively to the 
level of violence as well as to negative shocks affecting their income. We found that 
receiving the programme decreases migration only if violence is not unduly high. For the 
big majority of villages in our sample, our estimates show that the negative impact of the 
welfare programme on migration more than offsets the positive impact of violence 
associated to the number of displaced households. However, if violence affects household 
income, then receiving welfare benefits such as offered by the FA program does not 
compensate enough for the welfare losses entailed by violence.  
 
Our results have interesting policy implications if a government’s aim were to slow down 
migration flows out of the municipalities destabilised by the civil conflict. Even though 
welfare programs such as FA may be used as a way of curbing outmigration flows in 
some areas, they are not effective at mitigating migration flows in municipalities with 
very high level of violence. This warns us to be careful when extrapolating our results to 
advocate policy interventions in emergency situations that lead to large flows of 
displaced population. We also find that migration decisions are strongly determined by 
household property rights, type of insurance held by households and type of jobs of 
household heads and spouses. This further suggests that policy measures oriented towards 
rural development, access to housing market and health insurance would also contribute 
to stabilise sensitive areas affected by the civil war. 
 
We also found some evidence on the role played by liquidity constraints in migration 
decisions, as wealthier households are more likely to migrate. Moreover, in presence of 
shocks on household resources due to the death of some members, wealthier households 
are more likely to migrate out of their village of residence. Such complex interactions of 
liquidity constraints and violence levels may also explain why receiving the welfare 
programme tends to discourage households to migrate, unless violence levels are 
particularly high. 
 
However, to understand better how a welfare programme such as FA affects household 
migration decisions of very poor households, we would need to understand the larger 
picture of risk diversification mechanisms households adopt in order to mitigate the 
impact of negative shocks on their resources. This would require looking at the household 
decision to send members away as one of the several intra-household risk diversification 
mechanisms, a task we leave for further research once we have appropriate information 
on individual mobility in the next wave of data. 
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Figure 1 distribution of migration costs 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of number of displaced households who left the municipality of 
residence in the non migrant sample (on the left) and migrant sample (on the right) 
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Figure 3 effect of the programme and its interaction with violence incidence 
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Figure 4 adding the direct effect of violence to the programme effect to its interaction with violence 
 
Table 1 Logit of having moved out of the municipality of origin versus not being reached by 
interviewer at follow-up for unknown reason. 
 
Explanatory variables coefficients  
(standard errors) 
treat -0.406
 (0.376)
number of groups 0.232
 (0.103)**
dum_game 1.810
 (1.201)
group 1.450
 (0.889)
n_dispop 0.042
 (0.017)**
n_dispinp -0.008
 (0.002)***
curfew 1.683
 (0.783)**
presence of eln_farc_pm 0.199
 (0.360)
people in HH -0.507
 (0.378)
pershogsq 0.029
 (0.021)
kids 0-6 -0.011
 (0.552)
kid 0-6sq 0.056
 (0.121)
kids 7-17 0.516
 (0.403)
kid 7-17sq -0.032
 (0.061)
1 if EPS -2.683
 (1.348)**
1 if ARS -0.460
 (0.521)
1 if Vinculado 0.722
 (0.467)
 age_head 0.046
 (0.018)**
 age_spouse -0.013
 (0.021)
head of household primary not completed 0.454
 (0.393)
head of household primary completed 0.918
 (0.522)*
head of household secondary incompleted 1.030
 (0.663)
head of household secondary completed or more -0.230
 (1.852)
spouse primary not completed 0.679
 (0.365)*
spouse primary completed 0.916
 (0.486)*
spouse secondary incompleted 1.138
 (0.662)*
spouse secondary completed or more 1.413
 (0.874)
 work_h 18.491
 (0.759)***
 work_s 0.503
 (0.920)
 farm_h -0.572
 (0.425)
 farm_s 1.053
 (1.006)
 familywork_h -19.496
 (1.352)***
 familywork_s -1.714
 (1.533)
 employer_h -20.267
 (0.000)
 self_employed_h -18.444
 (0.673)***
 self_employed_s -1.835
 (1.173)
 employed_h -18.110
 (0.634)***
 employed_s -0.773
 (1.075)
 1 if lives in a house, O oth 0.391
 (1.093)
1 if walls made of Tapia, Abobe or Bahareque.  -0.501
 (0.416)
1 if walls made of wood     -1.066
 (0.585)*
1 if walls made of bad quality wood.     -0.334
 (0.787)
1 if no phone,0 oth 0.102
 (0.662)
1 if communal or radiotelephone, 0 oth 0.621
 (1.301)
1 if house is rented or anticresis, o oth 0.361
 (0.587)
1 if house is ocupada de hecho -1.601
 (0.893)*
1 if house is in usufruct 0.308
 (0.339)
dum_death 1.406
 (0.627)**
dum_ill01 0.516
 (0.601)
region==Oriental -3.472
 (0.638)***
region==Central -2.176
 (0.518)***
region==Pacifico -2.196
 (0.699)***
altitud to the sea level in metres -0.000
 (0.000)
cab2002 -0.000
 (0.000)
res2002 -0.000
 (0.000)***
number of urban public schools 0.018
 (0.043)
number of rural public schools  0.019
 (0.010)*
number of public hospitals -0.189
 (0.387)
number of public centros 0.333
 (0.173)*
number of public puestos 0.073
 (0.032)**
number of pharmacies -0.065
 (0.047)
acue01 2.942
 (1.404)**
alca01 2.751
 (0.738)***
   1 if taskforce desertion in IPS -0.490
 (0.620)
   1 if taskforce strike in IPS, 0 0.554
 (0.345)
1 if lives in a rural but disperse part, 0 oth -0.699
 (0.387)*
1 if lives in a rural but populated part, 0 oth 0.040
 (0.547)
Observations 400
Notes : * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2: Dictionary of variables of the FA survey and description of the sample 
 
Variables 
 
 
(1) 
Mean  
(sd) 
(2) 
Mean 
 (sd) 
Variable description 
0.58 0.60 treat 
(0.49) (0.49) 
1 if treated municipality, \0  
3.58 3.56 expo 
(3.47) (3.35) 
number of payments received at follow-up in municipality 
1236.03 1248.15wagem_r 
(710.22) (569.8) 
Average hourly wage in rural part of municipality 
1174.53 1200.6*wagem_u 
(323.94) (287.72)
Average hourly wage in urban part of municipality 
0.49 0.49 urbr_1 
(0.50) (0.50) 
1 if lives in urban, 0 otherwise. 
0.41 0.40 urbr_2 
(0.49) (0.49) 
1 if lives in a rural but disperse part of the municipality\0  
0.10 0.11 urbr_3 
(0.29) (0.31) 
1 if lives in a rural but populated part of the municipality\0   
6.10 5.55* pershog 
(2.44) (2.55) 
Number of people in the household 
1.13 1.10 kid 0-6 
(1.15) (1.11) 
Number of children aged between 0 and 6 years old 
2.13 1.93* Kid 7-17 
(1.39) (1.48) 
Number of children aged between 7 and 17 years old  
45.95 43.10* age_head 
(13.13) (13.27) 
Age of the head of household 
41.94 38.86* age_spouse 
(12.75) (12.66) 
Age of spouse 
0.20 0.26* single 
(0.40) (0.44) 
1 if the household head is single\0 
0.04 0.02* ss_h1 
(0.21) (0.15) 
1 if head of household has unsubsidized health insurance\0 
0.69 0.63* ss_h2 
(0.46) (0.48) 
1 if head of household has subsidized health insurance\0 
0.17 0.24* ss_h3 
(0.38) (0.43) 
if head of household has a letter from the municipality that  is 
similar to subsidized health insurance\0 
0.25 0.26 eduh 
(0.43) (0.44) 
 1 if head of household has at least completed the primary 
school\0
0.24 0.24 edus 
(0.43) (0.43) 
1 if the spouse has at least completed the primary school\0  
0.27 0.24 edu_h1 
(0.44) (0.43) 
1 if head of household has not education\0 
0.46 0.47 edu_h2 
(0.50) (0.50) 
1 if  the head of household has primary not completed\0 
0.14 0.14 edu_h3 
(0.35) (0.34) 
1 if head of household has completed primary school\0 
0.09 0.11 edu_h4 
(0.29) (0.31) 
1 if head of household secondary not completed\0 
0.04 0.04 edu_h5 
(0.19) (0.19) 
1 if head of household secondary completed or more\0 
0.23 0.19* edu_s1 
(0.42) (0.40) 
1 if spouse of household has not education\0 
0.46 0.50 edu_s2 
(0.50) (0.50) 
spouse primary not completed 
0.16 0.15 edu_s3 
(0.37) (0.35) 
spouse primary completed 
0.10 0.12 edu_s4 
(0.29) (0.32) 
spouse secondary not completed 
0.04 0.05 edu_s5 
(0.21) (0.21) 
spouse secondary completed or more 
0.97 0.94* house 
(0.16) (0.24) 
0 if family does not live in a house, 1 if it does. 
0.69 0.53* houseown_1 
(0.46) (0.50) 
1 if house is owned\0 
0.06 0.18* houseown_2 
(0.24) (0.38) 
1 if house is rented or in mortgage\0 
0.05 0.02* houseown_3 
(0.21) (0.13) 
1 if house is occupied without legal agreement\0  
0.20 0.26* houseown_4 
(0.40) (0.44) 
1 if house is in usufruct \0 
0.44 0.43 walls_mate~1 
(0.50) (0.50) 
1 if walls made of brick \0 
0.37 0.36 walls_mate~2 
(0.48) (0.48) 
1 if walls made of Tapia, Abobe or Bahareque. 
0.14 0.15 walls_mate~3 
(0.35) (0.36) 
1 if walls made of wood  
0.03 0.03 walls_mate~4 
(0.18) (0.18) 
1 if walls made of bad quality wood. 
0.01 0.02 walls_mate~5 
(0.11) (0.13) 
1 if walls made of cardboard or no walls. 
phone_3 0.90 0.89 1 if no phone\0
 (0.30) (0.31) 
0.02 0.01 phone_2 
(0.13) (0.12) 
1 if communal or radiotelephone\0 
0.08 0.09 phone_1 
(0.28) (0.29) 
1 if traditional phone\0 
0.05 0.06 dum_death 
(0.21) (0.23) 
1 if someone from the household died in 2000,2001 or 2002\0 
0.05 0.05 dum_ill01 
(0.23) (0.22) 
1 if someone from the household was very ill in 2001\0 
0.21 0.23 region2 
(0.41) (0.42) 
1 if lives in region==Oriental\0 
0.24 0.33 region3 
(0.43) (0.47) 
region==Central 
0.13 0.09 region4 
(0.34) (0.28) 
region==Pacifico 
595.86 642.15 altitud 
(735.94) (717.26)
altitud to the sea level in metres 
15382.85 13677.12cab2002 
(17921.23) (15285.00
population in the urban part in 2002 
14034.35 13695.38res2002 
(11151.83) (9754.95)
population in the rural part in 2002 
0.87 0.88* acue01 
(0.13) (0.13) 
proportion of households with piped water in municipality 
0.50 0.58* alca01 
(0.37) (0.34) 
Proportion of households with sewage system 
8.41 7.89 no_colurb_~c 
(8.72) (7.49) 
number of urban public schools in the municipality  
35.97 41.94* no_colrur_~c 
(27.15) (30.77) 
number of rural public schools in the municipality  
0.74 0.80* no_hos_alc 
(0.44) (0.40) 
number of public hospitals in the municipality 
0.89 0.82 no_cen_alc 
(1.20) (1.06) 
number of public centros 
4.88 5.51* no_pue_alc 
(4.61) (5.46) 
number of public puestos 
8.64 8.79 no_far_alc 
(6.70) (7.09) 
number of pharmacies 
0.09 0.17* d_desertion 
(0.29) (0.38) 
1 if in any IPS of our sample in the municipality suffered 
taskforce desertion, due to violence\0
0.25 0.30* d_strike 
(0.43) (0.46) 
1 if in any IPS of our sample in the municipality suffered 
taskforce strike\0
0.12 0.15* curfew 
(0.32) (0.35) 
presence of curfew in municipality 
0.61 0.73* eln_farc_pm 
(0.49) (0.44) 
presence of ELN, FARC or paramilitary groups  
0.65 0.78* probl_op 
(0.48) (0.42) 
problems in municipality  
5.42 10.19* n_dispop 
(13.51) (20.52) 
Number of displaced households from the municipality during 
the year before baseline 
49.44 49.33 n_dispinp 
(100.45) (89.91) 
 Number of displaced households joining the municipality 
during the year before baseline
0.28 0.31 group 
(0.17) (0.18) 
% of women participating in collective activity in the village 
0.93 1.38 ngroup 
(3.32) (3.86) 
Number of game groups in villages** 
0.82 0.77* work_h 
(0.38) (0.42) 
1 if head works\0 
0.23 0.19* work_s 
(0.42) (0.39) 
1 if spouse works\0 
0.46 0.38* farm_h 
(0.49) (0.48) 
1 if head works in agriculture\0 
0.04 0.03 farm_s 
(0.20) (0.17) 
1 if spouse works in agriculture\0 
0.01 0.01 familywork_h 
(0.10) (0.09) 
1 if head works in family enterprise\0 
0.02 0.01 familywork_s 
(0.14) (0.12) 
1 if spouse works in family enterprise\0 
0.03 0.02 employer_h 
(0.16) (0.14) 
1 if head is an employer\0 
0.003 0.003 employer_s 
(0.06) (0.05) 
1 if spouse is an employer\0 
0.40 0.29* self_employe
d h (0.49) (0.46) 
1 if head is self-employed\0 
0.10 0.06* self_employe
d s (0.30) (0.24) 
1 if spouse is self-employed\0 
0.35 0.39* employed_h 
(0.48) (0.49) 
1 if head is employed\0 
0.07 0.06 employed_s 
(0.26) (0.24) 
1 if spouse is employed\0 
Observations 11177 435 Total number of observations
Column (1) households who have not migrated 
Column (2) households who migrated out of their municipality of residence. 
* Significantly different as compared to the group of non migrants 
** This variable is available for 12 pilot areas only 
 
Table 3 Determinants of household migration 
 
 
Marginal effect  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Dropping 
some controls 
for  
municipality  
More 
education  
levels 
with control 
for occupations 
with controls 
for social 
capital 
treat -0.648 -0.628 -0.836 -1.124 -1.029 
 (0.499) (0.495) (0.505)* (0.402)*** (0.539)* 
n_dispop 0.034 0.039 0.032 0.024 0.031 
 (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)** (0.011)*** 
n_dispinp -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
curfew 1.110 0.208 0.939 1.143 0.902 
 (0.550)** (0.603) (0.567)* (0.527)** (0.565) 
presence of eln_farc_pm 0.821 1.282 0.969 1.364 0.774 
 (0.512) (0.526)** (0.530)* (0.437)*** (0.514) 
hourly wage in urban part 
of municipality*1000 
0.007 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
hourly wage in rural part 
of municipality*1000 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)** 
people in HH -0.518 -0.708 -0.701 -0.840 -0.708 
 (0.278)* (0.335)** (0.326)** (0.343)** (0.324)** 
pershogsq 0.023 0.029 0.028 0.035 0.029 
 (0.015) (0.017)* (0.016)* (0.018)** (0.016)* 
kids 0-6 -0.221 -0.150 -0.138 0.394 -0.142 
 (0.428) (0.498) (0.486) (0.509) (0.486) 
kid 0-6sq -0.000 0.028 0.025 -0.105 0.024 
 (0.095) (0.117) (0.114) (0.121) (0.113) 
kids 7-17 -0.407 -0.290 -0.290 -0.107 -0.285 
 (0.393) (0.483) (0.471) (0.513) (0.470) 
kid 7-17sq 0.088 0.086 0.087 0.050 0.085 
 (0.067) (0.080) (0.078) (0.089) (0.078) 
1 if EPS -3.553 -3.497 -3.533 -2.844 -3.546 
 (1.090)*** (1.235)*** (1.200)*** (1.153)** (1.202)*** 
1 if ARS -1.282 -1.056 -1.148 -1.049 -1.178 
 (0.575)** (0.661) (0.639)* (0.627)* (0.630)* 
1 if Vinculado -0.696 -0.424 -0.565 -0.365 -0.611 
 (0.648) (0.728) (0.708) (0.677) (0.700) 
 age_head 0.034 0.045 0.044 0.050 0.043 
 (0.019)* (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.022)** 
 age_spouse -0.076 -0.085 -0.082 -0.052 -0.082 
 (0.027)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.027)* (0.030)*** 
single 0.929 1.074 0.974  0.972 
 (0.457)** (0.516)** (0.507)*  (0.508)* 
edus -0.915     
 (0.608)     
eduh -0.028     
 (0.662)     
0 if family does not live in 
a house(room...), 1 if it 
does. 
1.187 1.274 1.227 1.762 1.241 
 (0.893) (0.910) (0.868) (1.185) (0.869) 
1 if walls made of Tapia, 
Abobe or Bahareque 
0.317 0.386 0.308 0.234 0.285 
 (0.435) (0.484) (0.473) (0.476) (0.468) 
1 if walls made of wood   0.365 0.367 0.349 0.428 0.424 
 (0.610) (0.594) (0.612) (0.598) (0.601) 
1 if walls made of bad 
quality wood.  
0.585 0.296 0.258 0.381 0.221 
 (0.944) (0.922) (0.909) (0.858) (0.908) 
1 if walls made of 
cardboard or no walls.  
1.072 1.245 1.241 0.296 1.342 
 (1.544) (1.540) (1.544) (1.614) (1.545) 
1 if no phone,0 oth 0.275 0.180 0.290 1.350 0.267 
 (0.717) (0.817) (0.781) (0.843) (0.782) 
1 if communal or 
radiotelephone, 0 oth 
-0.574 -0.440 -0.356 0.841 -0.409 
 (1.528) (1.608) (1.585) (1.644) (1.600) 
1 if house is rented or 
anticresis, o oth 
1.970 2.183 2.012 1.254 2.021 
 (0.554)*** (0.614)*** (0.599)*** (0.673)* (0.600)*** 
1 if house is ocupada de 
hecho 
-2.998 -3.378 -3.374 -3.364 -3.363 
 (1.681)* (1.598)** (1.592)** (1.363)** (1.591)** 
1 if house is in usufruct 0.865 1.054 1.020 1.092 1.016 
 (0.374)** (0.390)*** (0.383)*** (0.370)*** (0.385)*** 
dum_death 0.884 0.904 1.003 1.345 1.016 
 (0.751) (0.795) (0.778) (0.872) (0.779) 
dum_ill01 0.149 0.506 0.538 0.366 0.496 
 (0.674) (0.703) (0.689) (0.690) (0.691) 
region==Oriental -1.761 -1.361 -2.003 -2.351 -2.301 
 (0.805)** (0.852) (0.817)** (0.717)*** (0.827)*** 
region==Central -0.017 0.390 -0.390 -0.396 -0.762 
 (0.608) (0.609) (0.610) (0.556) (0.663) 
region==Pacifico -3.305 -2.513 -3.739 -3.642 -3.814 
 (0.921)*** (1.020)** (0.963)*** (0.902)*** (0.933)*** 
altitud to the sea level in 
metres 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)* 
cab2002 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
res2002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)** 
number of urban public 
schools 
-0.089  -0.094 -0.083 -0.071 
 (0.052)*  (0.054)* (0.059) (0.057) 
number of rural public 
schools  
0.012  0.012 0.019 0.014 
 (0.010)  (0.010) (0.009)** (0.010) 
number of public hospitals 0.441  0.509 -0.337 0.470 
 (0.774)  (0.814) (0.645) (0.801) 
number of public centros 0.005  -0.027 -0.086 -0.027 
 (0.231)  (0.238) (0.199) (0.234) 
number of public puestos 0.099  0.120 0.090 0.114 
 (0.054)*  (0.057)** (0.051)* (0.056)** 
number of pharmacies 0.046  0.046 0.041 0.043 
 (0.063)  (0.067) (0.056) (0.068) 
acue01 -0.460  -0.577 0.744 -1.065 
 (1.527)  (1.522) (1.333) (1.569) 
alca01 1.355  1.325 1.468 1.466 
 (0.924)  (0.953) (0.883)* (0.930) 
   1 if taskforce desertion 
in IPS 
0.732 1.107 0.512 0.013 0.675 
 (0.582) (0.626)* (0.597) (0.551) (0.616) 
   1 if taskforce strike in 
IPS, 0 
0.168 0.534 0.246 0.304 0.328 
 (0.497) (0.493) (0.516) (0.453) (0.504) 
1 if lives in a rural but 
disperse part, 0 oth 
-0.104 0.029 -0.037 0.467 -0.036 
 (0.552) (0.579) (0.579) (0.636) (0.579) 
1 if lives in a rural but 
populated part, 0 oth 
0.738 1.043 0.935 1.374 1.016 
 (0.606) (0.640) (0.637) (0.639)** (0.643) 
head of household primary 
not completed 
 0.129 0.137 0.156 0.129 
  (0.488) (0.485) (0.481) (0.481) 
head of household primary 
completed 
 -0.750 -0.708 -0.340 -0.736 
  (0.645) (0.641) (0.570) (0.639) 
head of household 
secondary incompleted 
 -0.088 -0.075 0.138 -0.070 
  (0.896) (0.890) (0.776) (0.883) 
head of household 
secondary completed or 
more 
 -0.688 -0.568 -1.019 -0.546 
  (1.239) (1.224) (1.244) (1.218) 
spouse primary not 
completed 
 0.435 0.485 0.442 0.494 
  (0.519) (0.509) (0.530) (0.509) 
spouse primary completed  0.197 0.208 0.554 0.207 
  (0.624) (0.615) (0.598) (0.614) 
spouse secondary 
incompleted 
 0.369 0.408 0.745 0.394 
  (0.748) (0.743) (0.673) (0.740) 
spouse secondary 
completed or more 
 -0.060 0.002 0.084 -0.038 
  (0.954) (0.935) (0.972) (0.941) 
group     0.018 
     (0.012) 
 dumwork_h    0.020  
    (0.030)  
 dumwork_s    -0.005  
    (0.004)  
 farm_h    -0.890  
    (0.456)*  
 farm_s    0.131  
    (1.281)  
 work_h    3.669  
    (1.292)***  
 work_s    1.666  
    (3.588)  
 familywork_s    -0.841  
    (3.875)  
 employer_h    -5.266  
    (1.481)***  
 employer_s    -0.955  
    (4.656)  
 self_employed_h    -4.542  
    (1.209)***  
 self_employed_s    -2.987  
    (3.696)  
 domestic_h    -1.134  
    (1.787)  
 domestic_s    -0.789  
    (3.839)  
 employed_h    -3.475  
    (1.237)***  
 employed_s    -2.926  
    (3.749)  
Observations 9630 8837 8837 7078 8837 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All parameters and standard errors(in brackets) have been multiplied by 100. 
 
Table 4: migration determinants with intensity effects of the programme 
 
Marginal effects  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Full set of control 
variables 
Dropping some  
municipilaty level 
Adding more controls 
for education levels 
variables 
number of payments -0.095 -0.085 -0.118 
 (0.058)* (0.061) (0.068)* 
 n_dispop 0.027 0.030 0.030 
 (0.012)** (0.013)** (0.012)** 
 n_dispinp -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
curfew 0.528 0.028 -0.126 
 (0.497) (0.557) (0.554) 
presence of eln_farc_pm 0.333 1.055 1.182 
 (0.600) (0.394)*** (0.437)*** 
problems in mpio 0.588   
 (0.704)   
people in HH -0.617 -0.614 -0.819 
 (0.307)** (0.317)* (0.347)** 
pershogsq 0.030 0.030 0.037 
 (0.018)* (0.019) (0.020)* 
kids 0-6 -0.163 -0.167 -0.076 
 (0.430) (0.441) (0.485) 
kid 0-6sq -0.019 -0.017 0.006 
 (0.095) (0.098) (0.121) 
kids 7-17 -0.343 -0.362 -0.244 
 (0.504) (0.522) (0.597) 
kid 7-17sq 0.081 0.084 0.083 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.102) 
1 if EPS -3.587 -3.558 -3.541 
 (0.916)*** (0.918)*** (1.022)*** 
1 if ARS -1.118 -1.048 -0.954 
 (0.597)* (0.606)* (0.716) 
1 if Vinculado -0.504 -0.384 -0.241 
 (0.631) (0.643) (0.729) 
 age_head 0.030 0.032 0.041 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.024)* 
 age_spouse -0.072 -0.073 -0.080 
 (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.032)** 
single 0.770 0.843 0.890 
 (0.420)* (0.419)** (0.497)* 
edus -0.834 -0.846  
 (0.504)* (0.517)  
eduh 0.021 0.020  
 (0.519) (0.518)  
 1 if lives in a house, O oth  0.644 0.702 0.789 
 (0.840) (0.870) (0.845) 
1 if walls made of Tapia, Abobe or 
Bahareque.     
0.231 0.310 0.293 
 (0.418) (0.426) (0.451) 
1 if walls made of wood        0.398 0.360 0.298 
 (0.654) (0.651) (0.621) 
1 if walls made of bad quality wood.   0.432 0.487 0.129 
 (0.944) (0.908) (0.838) 
1 if walls made of cardboard or no 
walls.         
0.932 0.874 1.045 
 (1.724) (1.708) (1.693) 
1 if no phone,0 oth 0.014 -0.067 -0.113 
 (0.515) (0.517) (0.663) 
1 if communal or radiotelephone, 0 -0.939 -1.046 -0.852 
oth 
 (1.414) (1.420) (1.492) 
1 if house is rented or mortgage, o 
oth 
2.123 2.259 2.336 
 (0.422)*** (0.430)*** (0.469)*** 
1 if house is squatted -2.924 -2.973 -3.377 
 (1.303)** (1.298)** (1.107)*** 
1 if house is in usufruct 0.903 0.929 1.098 
 (0.326)*** (0.328)*** (0.324)*** 
Dum_death 0.765 0.702 0.784 
 (0.953) (0.972) (0.935) 
Dum_ill01 0.046 0.051 0.430 
 (0.534) (0.526) (0.551) 
region==Oriental -1.715 -1.180 -1.466 
 (0.766)** (0.600)** (0.612)** 
region==Central -0.011 0.720 0.294 
 (0.594) (0.536) (0.510) 
region==Pacifico -3.212 -2.498 -2.801 
 (0.650)*** (0.758)*** (0.837)*** 
altitud to the sea level in metres 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)*** 
Cab2002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Res2002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
number of urban public schools -0.032   
 (0.044)   
number of rural public schools  0.008   
 (0.010)   
number of public hospitals 0.320   
 (0.778)   
number of public centros 0.041   
 (0.207)   
number of public puestos 0.075   
 (0.048)   
number of pharmacies 0.023   
 (0.051)   
acue01 -0.580   
 (1.184)   
alca01 1.428   
 (0.854)*   
1 if in any IPS of our sample in the 
municipality suffered taskforce 
desertion, 
1.044 1.670 1.458 
 (0.595)* (0.640)*** (0.680)** 
1 if in any IPS of our sample in the 
municipality suffered taskforce 
strike, 0 
0.250 0.354 0.507 
 (0.510) (0.467) (0.509) 
1 if lives in a rural but disperse part, 
0 oth 
0.062 0.135 0.157 
 (0.574) (0.574) (0.598) 
1 if lives in a rural but populated 
part, 0 oth 
0.894 0.997 1.148 
 (0.457)* (0.468)** (0.490)** 
head of household primary not   0.099 
completed 
   (0.502) 
head of household primary 
completed 
  -0.544 
   (0.603) 
head of household secondary 
incompleted 
  -0.109 
   (0.647) 
head of household secondary 
completed or more 
  -0.583 
   (0.992) 
spouse primary not completed   0.513 
   (0.589) 
spouse primary completed   0.187 
   (0.681) 
spouse secondary incompleted   0.381 
   (0.688) 
spouse secondary completed or 
more 
  0.010 
   (0.751) 
Observations 10123 10123 9288 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All parameters and standard errors(in brackets) have been multiplied by 100. 
 
Table 5 Effects of the programme interacted with violence as defined by the number of displaced 
households in the village 
 
Marginal effects 
(dP/dX) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dropping some 
municipality var 
With more 
municipality 
var. 
With controls for 
occupations 
With control for 
social capital 
treat -1.240 -1.725 -2.326 -1.869 
 (0.666)* (0.751)** (0.601)*** (0.758)** 
Pgm*eln_farc_pm 0.538 0.731 1.306 0.643 
 (0.864) (0.852) (0.674)* (0.826) 
Pgm* n_dispop 0.041 0.052 0.039 0.053 
 (0.019)** (0.018)*** (0.017)** (0.017)*** 
n_dispop 0.033 0.025 0.020 0.024 
 (0.011)*** (0.010)** (0.008)** (0.010)** 
n_dispinp -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
curfew 0.126 0.868 1.100 0.834 
 (0.559) (0.526)* (0.491)** (0.523) 
presence of 
eln_farc_pm 
0.888 0.455 0.546 0.309 
 (0.719) (0.750) (0.583) (0.728) 
hourly wage in rural 
part of 
municipality*1000 
-0.307 -0.422 -0.325 -0.433 
 (0.217) (0.196)** (0.192)* (0.201)** 
hourly wage in urban 
part of 
municipality*1000 
0.859 0.763 0.740 0.840 
 (0.797) (1.002) (0.815) (1.000) 
people in HH -0.704 -0.686 -0.820 -0.693 
 (0.333)** (0.322)** (0.338)** (0.321)** 
pershogsq 0.029 0.028 0.035 0.029 
 (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.018)** (0.016)* 
kids 0-6 -0.150 -0.144 0.389 -0.149 
 (0.497) (0.484) (0.506) (0.485) 
kid 0-6sq 0.029 0.027 -0.103 0.026 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.121) (0.113) 
kids 7-17 -0.278 -0.283 -0.092 -0.279 
 (0.481) (0.468) (0.507) (0.468) 
kid 7-17sq 0.083 0.084 0.046 0.083 
 (0.079) (0.077) (0.089) (0.077) 
1 if EPS -3.592 -3.615 -2.940 -3.624 
 (1.230)*** (1.202)*** (1.163)** (1.201)*** 
1 if ARS -1.117 -1.212 -1.148 -1.237 
 (0.656)* (0.636)* (0.627)* (0.626)** 
1 if Vinculado -0.434 -0.576 -0.434 -0.619 
 (0.719) (0.701) (0.670) (0.692) 
 age_head 0.046 0.044 0.049 0.043 
 (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.022)** 
 age_spouse -0.085 -0.082 -0.052 -0.081 
 (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.026)* (0.030)*** 
single 1.082 0.978  0.976 
 (0.516)** (0.506)*  (0.506)* 
head of household 
primary not completed 
0.144 0.154 0.186 0.145 
 (0.490) (0.485) (0.478) (0.482) 
head of household 
primary completed 
-0.717 -0.679 -0.313 -0.708 
 (0.643) (0.637) (0.563) (0.634) 
head of household 
secondary incompleted 
-0.078 -0.072 0.134 -0.065 
 (0.892) (0.887) (0.771) (0.880) 
head of household 
secondary completed 
or more 
-0.641 -0.499 -0.928 -0.476 
 (1.240) (1.221) (1.246) (1.213) 
spouse primary not 
completed 
0.412 0.451 0.402 0.463 
 (0.516) (0.508) (0.527) (0.508) 
spouse primary 
completed 
0.206 0.208 0.536 0.210 
 (0.619) (0.610) (0.593) (0.608) 
spouse secondary 
incompleted 
0.349 0.361 0.689 0.349 
 (0.745) (0.740) (0.669) (0.737) 
spouse secondary 
completed or more 
-0.100 -0.079 -0.008 -0.119 
 (0.953) (0.933) (0.962) (0.937) 
 1 if lives in a house, O 
oth 
1.285 1.229 1.760 1.244 
 (0.901) (0.861) (1.178) (0.862) 
1 if walls made of 
Tapia, Abobe or 
Bahareque.    
0.391 0.312 0.213 0.294 
 (0.478) (0.461) (0.463) (0.456) 
1 if walls made of 
wood     
0.402 0.376 0.441 0.448 
 (0.590) (0.608) (0.591) (0.597) 
1 if walls made of bad 
quality wood.     
0.335 0.267 0.373 0.233 
 (0.921) (0.898) (0.838) (0.897) 
1 if no phone,0 oth 0.169 0.277 1.329 0.255 
 (0.820) (0.784) (0.836) (0.784) 
1 if communal or 
radiotelephone, 0 oth 
-0.484 -0.440 0.719 -0.491 
 (1.607) (1.599) (1.650) (1.612) 
1 if house is rented or 
anticresis, o oth 
2.201 2.035 1.249 2.045 
 (0.615)*** (0.598)*** (0.661)* (0.598)*** 
1 if house is ocupada 
de hecho 
-3.368 -3.346 -3.352 -3.331 
 (1.591)** (1.581)** (1.341)** (1.580)** 
1 if house is in 
usufruct 
1.046 1.016 1.076 1.014 
 (0.388)*** (0.381)*** (0.364)*** (0.382)*** 
dum_death 0.874 0.996 1.306 1.008 
 (0.789) (0.771) (0.862) (0.773) 
dum_ill01 0.501 0.539 0.376 0.500 
 (0.700) (0.687) (0.686) (0.687) 
region==Oriental -1.298 -1.918 -2.288 -2.219 
 (0.828) (0.790)** (0.681)*** (0.799)*** 
region==Central 0.485 -0.231 -0.252 -0.596 
 (0.605) (0.576) (0.505) (0.625) 
region==Pacifico -2.419 -3.701 -3.617 -3.777 
 (1.009)** (0.962)*** (0.882)*** (0.935)*** 
altitud to the sea level 
in metres 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** 
cab2002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
res2002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)** 
   1 if taskforce 
desertion in IPS 
1.102 0.345 -0.113 0.521 
 (0.566)* (0.544) (0.572) (0.564) 
   1 if taskforce strike 
in IPS, 0 
0.473 0.138 0.201 0.217 
 (0.476) (0.511) (0.429) (0.497) 
1 if lives in a rural but 
disperse part, 0 oth 
0.089 0.020 0.521 0.021 
 (0.585) (0.584) (0.637) (0.583) 
1 if lives in a rural but 
populated part, 0 oth 
1.101 0.985 1.412 1.066 
 (0.646)* (0.644) (0.639)** (0.650) 
number of urban 
public schools 
 -0.056 -0.040 -0.035 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) 
number of rural public 
schools  
 0.017 0.024 0.019 
  (0.010) (0.009)** (0.010)* 
number of public 
hospitals 
 0.392 -0.443 0.357 
  (0.790) (0.605) (0.782) 
number of public 
centros 
 -0.063 -0.136 -0.064 
  (0.241) (0.201) (0.236) 
number of public 
puestos 
 0.118 0.091 0.111 
  (0.053)** (0.049)* (0.052)** 
number of pharmacies  0.062 0.052 0.059 
  (0.065) (0.053) (0.067) 
acue01  -0.075 0.971 -0.543 
  (1.497) (1.260) (1.539) 
alca01  1.134 1.260 1.283 
  (0.903) (0.836) (0.874) 
group    1.824 
    (1.078)* 
number of groups     
     
dum_game     
     
 dumwork_h   1.545  
   (1.835)  
 dumwork_s   -0.522  
   (0.395)  
 farm_h   -0.899  
   (0.456)**  
 farm_s   0.170  
   (1.273)  
 work_h   3.736  
   (1.253)***  
 work_s   1.496  
   (3.554)  
 familywork_s   -0.720  
   (3.852)  
 employer_h   -5.332  
   (1.437)***  
 employer_s   -0.947  
   (4.630)  
 self_employed_h   -4.551  
   (1.170)***  
 self_employed_s   -2.879  
   (3.662)  
 domestic_h   -1.317  
   (1.754)  
 domestic_s   -0.677  
   (3.811)  
 employed_h   -3.545  
   (1.206)***  
 employed_s   -2.786  
   (3.711)  
Observations 8837 8837 7078 8837 
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All parameters and standard errors(in brackets) have been multiplied by 100. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Effects of violence interacted with household characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
people in HH -12.960 -19.725 -14.919 -20.154 
 (6.084)** (6.704)*** (5.377)*** (6.354)*** 
people squared 0.611 0.813 0.657 0.826 
 (0.308)** (0.334)** (0.271)** (0.332)** 
kids 0-6 9.119 16.018 10.057 16.150 
 (8.807) (9.630)* (8.661) (9.695)* 
Kids squared -2.285 -2.889 -2.296 -2.976 
 (2.017) (2.248) (2.006) (2.305) 
kids 7-17 0.259 6.151 2.289 6.351 
 (8.019) (8.992) (8.520) (10.455) 
kids 7-17 squ 0.036 -0.298 -0.047 -0.237 
 (1.308) (1.479) (1.458) (1.852) 
age_head 0.354 0.542 0.395 0.618 
 (0.417) (0.445) (0.325) (0.401) 
age_spouse -0.452 -0.521 -0.708 -0.704 
 (0.485) (0.528) (0.472) (0.518) 
Violpershog 0.471 0.590 0.514 0.648 
 (0.294) (0.303)* (0.191)*** (0.192)*** 
Violpershogsq -0.022 -0.028 -0.022 -0.028 
 (0.015) (0.016)* (0.015) (0.014)** 
Violkids0-6 -0.909 -1.082 -0.982 -1.156 
 (0.456)** (0.475)** (0.362)*** (0.373)*** 
Violkids0-6sq 0.130 0.183 0.140 0.187 
 (0.108) (0.114) (0.119) (0.102)* 
Viol kids 7-17 -0.602 -0.749 -0.691 -0.891 
 (0.418) (0.436)* (0.344)** (0.337)*** 
Violkids7-17sq 0.091 0.104 0.094 0.111 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.052)* (0.055)** 
Violage_head 0.029 0.032 0.023 0.024 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.012)* (0.014)* 
Violage_spou -0.037 -0.031 -0.030 -0.023 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.016)* (0.019) 
Observations 7623 7078 7614 7069 
 
Notes : Probit model. Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All parameters and standard errors(in brackets) have been multiplied by 100. 
Only the coefficients associated to a selection of control variable are displayed (ViolVariable means 
interaction term of violence incidence with Variable). 
The other control variables (not shown) are the same as in Table 5. 
Specification (1) is without occupation levels of the parents and controls for high education levels of the 
parents, specification (2) uses more controls for education levels of parents, specifications (3) and (4) 
control for occupations of the parents, with more education levels in specification in (4) than in (3) 
 
 
Table 7 Effects of different types of risks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
treat -1.273 -1.230 -1.202 -1.119 
 (0.536)** (0.535)** (0.499)** (0.516)** 
Programme *violence 0.057 0.057 0.038 0.039 
 (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.019)** (0.017)** 
Number of displaced hhds 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.025 
 (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
presence of eln_farc_pm 0.911 0.863 1.043 1.028 
 (0.515)* (0.512)* (0.454)** (0.458)** 
hh shock: death02 2.137  2.421 2.442 
 (0.929)**  (0.929)*** (0.924)*** 
hh shock: illness02 0.194  0.119  
 (0.594)  (0.582)  
hh shock: croploss02 -0.508  -0.441  
 (0.452)  (0.454)  
hh shock: busloss02 0.460  0.399  
 (1.474)  (1.476)  
hh shock: fireflood02 -1.457  -1.346  
 (1.793)  (1.793)  
hh shock: violence02 3.067  3.272 3.218 
 (1.173)***  (1.162)*** (1.160)*** 
hh shock: death012  0.942   
  (0.708)   
hh shock: illness012  0.724   
  (0.439)*   
hh shock: croploss012  0.197   
  (0.340)   
hh shock: busloss012  -0.159   
  (1.136)   
hh shock: fireflood012  -1.710   
  (0.962)*   
hh shock: violence012  1.347   
  (0.886)   
%hhs in vill with death 
02 
  -0.349 -0.344 
   (0.130)*** (0.136)** 
%hhs in vill with income 
losses due to viol 02 
  -0.300 -0.250 
   (0.152)** (0.144)* 
%hhs in vill with illness 
02 
  0.071  
   (0.047)  
%hhs in vill with 
bus.losses/fireflood/crop 
02 
  -0.010  
   (0.023)  
Observations 8837 8837 8837 8837 
 
Notes : Marginal effects of a Probit model are reported in percentage points. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at municipality level). * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Only the coefficients associated to a selection of control variable are displayed. Other control variables (not 
shown) include all family and municipality variables excluding proxies for occupation of household heads 
and for social capital. Results are stable when adding or not the latter variables. 
In column (1) we control for household schocks occuring in 2002 only, while in column (2) we control for 
the occurence of schocks during one of the three years preceeding the survey. Results in column (3) are 
obtained after controlling for household and village level shocks, and column (4) keeps only the negative 
schocks that have significant impacts at conventional levels. 
